This study examined the relationship between human resource practices, employee quit rates, and organizational performance in the service sector. Drawing on a unique, nationally representative sample of call centers, multivariate analyses showed that quit rates were lower and sales growth was higher in estahlishments that emphasized high skills, employee participation in decision making and in teams, and human resource incentives such as high relative pay and employment security. Quit rates partially mediated the relationship hetween human resource practices and sales growth. These relationships were also moderated hy the customer segment served.
Research in strategic human resource management has made considerable progress in documenting a link between organizational performance and human resource (HR) strategies that invest in the human capital of the workforce (Becker & Gerhart, 1996; Huselid, 1995; Ichniowski, Kochan, Levine, Olson, & Strauss, 1996) . These strategies, often referred to as high-involvement or high-performance systems, generally include coherent sets of HR practices that enhance employee skills, participation in decisions, and motivation (Appelbaum, Bailey, Berg, & Kalleberg, 2000; Delery, 1998) . Recent reviews, however, have identified several theoretical and methodological weaknesses in this literature (Becker & Gerhart, 1996; Delery, 1998; Wright & Sherman, 1999) . First, prior research is theoretically undeveloped and has not specified the mediating employee behaviors that explain the relationship between HR practices and perfor-' mance. Second, although the strategic human resource theory prediction is that external factors such as business strategy should moderate the human resources-performance link, only a few studies support this view (Arthur, 1992; Wright, Smart, & McMahan, 1995; Youndt, Snell, Dean, & Lepak, 1996) . In addition, despite the fact that three-quarters of employment is in services, empirical evidence of a HR-performance link is based largely on blue-collar workers in manufacturing plants ( Appelbaum et al., 2000; Ichniowski et al., 1996) . For a variety of reasons, manufacturing studies may not generalize to service settings; differences in demography, occupational groups, technologies, work processes, the level of technically required interdependence among workers, and the role of the customer in the production process may all be relevant (Bowen & Schneider, 1988; Mills, Ghase, & Marguiles, 1983; Zimmerman & Enell, 1988) . Thus, extension of previous findings to the service sector is needed.
This study contributes to the strategic human resource literature in three ways. First, I elaborate a theory of how high-involvement human resource practices allow firms to build the kind of firmspecific human capital that leads to better performance, and I test whether the effects of HR practices on performance are mediated by employee quit rates. Second, drawing on a nationally representative sample of establishments in the U.S. telecommunications services industry, I extend the study of high-involvement practices to a new context that has grown dramatically in employment and strategic importance-technology-mediated customer service and sales operations, or call centers. Third, I consider whether the HR-performance link is moderated by customer segment, an important component of business strategy in sales and marketing.
PRIOR RESEARCH
High-involvement systems have been defined in various ways, but they generally include three dimensions: relatively high skill requirements; work designed so that employees have discretion and opportunity to use their skills in collaboration with other workers; and an incentive structure that enhances motivation and commitment (Appelbaum et al., 2000; Delery & Doty, 1996; Huselid, 1995; MacDuffie, 1995) . Glassic mass production approaches, by contrast, emphasize low skill requirements, narrow jobs with low discretion, and few incentives for discretionary effort.
Empirical studies have shown that high-involvement systems are associated with better performance in manufacturing plants (Appelbaimi et al., 2000; Arthur, 1992 Arthur, , 1994 Ichniowski et al., 1996; MacDuffie, 1995; Youndt et al., 1996) . Few quantitative studies of high-involvement practices in service settings exist, but one study of bank loan officers did find that three HR practices (results-oriented appraisals, employment security, and profit sharing) were associated with higher financial performance (Delery & Doty, 1996) .
In this research, I extend past work by developing the argument that high-involvement HR practices allow a firm to build firm-specific human capital, which in turn influences organizational performance in two ways: directly, via its effect on employee performance, and indirectly, via employee attachment to the firm. Below, I elaborate how this theory applies to customer-contact service employees in call centers.
HR Practices, Firm-Specific Capital, and Performance
The argument for a direct link between human resource practices and employee performance in customer service settings hinges on the idea that high-involvement practices help employees develop the kind of firm-specific human capitalknowledge of a firm's products, customers, and work processes-that enables them to interact effectively with customers. Firm-specific human capital is important because these customer-contact employees manage the boundary between the firm and its customers (Mills et al., 1983) , and the behavior of these employees shapes customers' buying behavior. To persuade customers to buy a firm's products and services, employees need a clear understanding of specific product features, service agreements, pricing, packaging, promotions for particular customer segments, and legal regulations. They need customer-specific knowledge regarding the demand characteristics of particular individuals or segments and need to know how to use that knowledge to negotiate customized offerings. Employees also require specific knowledge of the structure and content of the firm's information systems, the work flow from point of sales to delivery, and how the company's processing capabilities affect each customer and product offering.
The three dimensions of high-involvement HR systems help employees acquire this firm-specific human capital. First, high-involvement systems emphasize the selective hiring of employees with high general skills (or formal education) plus a firm investment in initial training. This combination provides a firm with a skilled workforce capable of ongoing learning. The capacity to learn is critical because in current markets, intense competition and proliferation of new products lead to constant change in marketing, pricing, and packaging. Employees need to integrate new product and sales information into their existing knowledge and to explain these changes to customers.
The second dimension of high-involvement systems involves the design of work to provide opportunities for individual discretion and ongoing learning through collaboration with other employees. Gustomer-contact employees with high individual discretion are able to respond immediately to customer demands and to take advantage of sales opportunities when interacting with customers. High-involvement systems also provide opportunities for continuous learning through participation in "off-line" problem-solving groups (in which employees and supervisors meet periodically) and "on-line" groups (such as self-directed teams in which groups rather than individuals form the basic unit of production and are responsible for many decisions). Reviews of the teams literature show significant, positive relationships between semiautonomous work groups and performance outcomes (Gohen & Bailey, 1997) . For customer-contact employees, participation in both types of teams is likely to pay off because it creates opportunities for ongoing learning-not because participation changes the content of their work (for instance, sales agents still interact individually with customers). Batt (1999) , for example, found that sales representatives in self-directed teams had the same job duties as those in traditionally supervised groups, but the former had higher sales productivity because they benefited from better learning and problem solving on how to handle customers and new technology.
The third dimension of high-involvement systems includes HR incentives such as ongoing investment in training, employment security, high relative pay, and performance management systems that build trust. Firm-provided training rewards employees with additional skills and opportunities for higher-paying jobs. Employment security allows workers to suggest labor-saving improvements without fear of job loss. Efficiency wage theory posits that employees with high relative pay and low performance monitoring will be more productive in order to avoid the prospect of a worse job on the external market (Krueger & Summers, 1987) . The use of electronic monitoring for performance management is a common practice in call centers, and extensive research shows that it creates employee disaffection and stress (Garayon, 1993) , which can have negative spillover effects on interactions with customers.
Quit Rates as Mediating Mechanisms
High-involvement practices also may influence organizational performance indirectly, through lower employee quit rates. Some empirical studies, for example, have shown a significant, inverse relationship between high-involvement practices and quit rates (Arthur, 1994; Shaw, Delery, Jenkins, & Gupta, 1998) and quit rates and productivity (Huselid, 1995) . For example, firms that are less selective or hire lower-skilled employees are likely to experience higher quit rates. The design of work is likely to influence quit rates through its impact on intrinsic motivation, as demonstrated in the large body of research on job characteristics (Hackman & Oldham, 1980) . Greater autonomy is associated with higher satisfaction and lower intentions to quit at the individual level of analysis (Gotton & Tuttle, 1986; Hom & Griffeth, 1986) . Employees in problem-solving and self-directed teams experience greater autonomy and satisfaction (Gohen & Bailey, 1997 ), which in turn should reduce quit rates (Gotton, 1993) .
Finally, human resource incentives such as training, employment security, high relative pay, and practices that build trust are likely to induce employee attachment and commitment. Some empirical research has shown significant, negative relationships between individual turnover and employment security measured at an individual level (Gotton & Tuttle, 1986; Shaw et al., 1998) and between turnover and higher compensation levels (Leonard, 1987; Powell, Montgomery, & Gosgrove, 1994; Shaw et al., 1998) . Pervasive use of electronic monitoring creates dissatisfaction and stress among employees, providing incentives for workers to quit, as demonstrated in prior research (Garayon, 1993; Shaw et al., 1998; Wilson & Peel, 1991) .
In customer-contact settings, high quit rates not only increase the costs of recruitment and selection, but negatively affect sales growth because new employees face a learning curve. Long-term employees have the tacit firm-specific skills and knowledge-and often the personal relationships with customers-needed to more effectively interact with customers. Some case studies have shown that employee turnover (or, conversely, loyalty) is correlated with customer turnover (or loyalty) (Heskett, Sasser, & Schlesinger, 1997) . Loyal customers are critical to sales growth because they tend to buy a wider range of products and more value-added products (Reichheld, 1996) . Long-term employees have the accumulated tacit knowledge of products, customers, and work processes needed to provide high-quality service to these loyal customers. Thus, high quit rates are likely to negatively affect sales growth.
In sum, high-involvement practices are likely to contribute to higher sales directly by creating a workforce capable of customizing service and sales to its particular customer segment. They also are likely to induce employee attachment, and longterm employees with firm-specific skills are likely to be more productive. These arguments are consistent with a resource-based theory of the firm (Barney, 1995) : by building a workforce with deep tacit knowledge of products, customers, and processes, high-involvement practices create resources that are valuable, rare, and hard to imitate, thereby conferring competitive advantage. The arguments are also consistent with theories of social capital (Leana & Van Buren, 1999) : it is not only that each individual has firm-specific knowledge, but also that the social capital, or stable relationships and collaboration among employees, allow them to continually deepen their knowledge and service and sales capabilities.
An alternative approach to services would follow the engineering logic of mass production manufacturing. In such an alternative to the high-involvement model, individual efficiency is high because workers learn standardized tasks through repetition (Levitt, 1972) . Labor costs are minimized through low investment in selection, training, participation, and compensation. Information technology is used primarily to automate tasks and electronically monitor performance. However, customer satisfaction and loyalty are likely to suffer because employees have little discretion to meet customer needs and because the greater division of labor increases the number of employees customers must deal with (Heskett et al., 1997 
Exploring the Moderating Effect of Market Segment
If the customer-employee relationship is the critical factor in customer-contact service work, then a central question is whether high-involvement practices confer greater competitive advantage when employees serve some customer segments rather than others. To confer competitive advantage, resources must be valuable, rare, and hard to imitate (Barney, 1995) .
One way to consider the question of customer segments as moderating factors is to view highinvolvement practices as a strategy for quasiprofessionalizing nonmanagers-enhancing skills, opportunity for independent judgment, and motivation. In manufacturing, for example, highinvolvement practices enhance the capability of high school educated blue-collar workers, not engineers or technical staff. In customer-contact settings, however, "production-level" jobs range from those held by high school educated workers selling to mass-market consumers, to those of college-educated professionals serving as account executives. In markets serving customers for high-value-added products, such as large businesses, customers may demand professional attention. Hence, use of high-involvement practices is likely to be viewed as the price of market entry: a firm needs them if it is to compete (they are valuable), but their use is not sufficient to confer any special competitive advantage (they are not rare or inimitable).
For lower-value-added residential and small business consumers in the mass market, however, the workforce is comparable to blue-collar workers in manufacturing. Firms typically adopt a production line approach to services, emphasizing highvolume, low-cost transactions. High-involvement practices may be perceived as costly and as not sufficiently valuable to confer competitive advantage. Nevertheless, the literature on mass customization (e.g.. Pine, 1993) suggests that such practices indeed are sufficiently valuable in mass markets because consumers are increasingly demanding customization and "service bundling." In telecommunications services mass markets, for example, customers demand bundled billing and provision of services for local and long-distance calling, wireless services, high-speed data lines, Internet access, and enhanced features such as call waiting, call forwarding, voice messaging, and the like. If employees have the skills and discretion to create customized packages of multiple services, rather than being limited by standardized menus, they will sell more and sell more value-added services. This line of argument suggests that the characteristics of mass customized markets make highinvolvement HR practices valuable; but cost pressures and the conventional focus on a transactional approach make high-involvement practices rare and difficult to imitate. This line of argument suggests the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4. The positive effect of highinvolvement human resource practices on sales growth will be stronger for establishments serving low-value-added (residential and small business) customers than for those serving high-value-added (large business) customers.
METHODS

Sample
The sample for this study is a nationally representative stratified random sample drav«i from the Dun & Bradstreet listings of establishments. An establishment is defined as one work location, such as a manufacturing plant, or in this study, a call center. A call center provides telephone-mediated service and/or sales to customers. This study included only centers customers call into, not outbound telemarketing centers. Establishments were stratified by size (10-99 or 100-plus employees), industry segment (cellular, wire-line, cable, or Internet services), and location (U. S. state). I oversampled establishments with over 100 employees so that the results would represent a larger percentage of the industry's workforce. The sample breakdown is as follows: 53 percent were in wire-line communication; 24 percent were in wireless; 16 percent were in cable TV; and 7 percent were in Internet services.
As Becker and Gerhart (1996: 792) suggested, I analyzed comparable establishments (call centers) in one industry and, because HR practices vary considerably by occupational group, I focused on the "core" workforce, defined as the largest group of nonmanagerial employees (e.g., Arthur, 1992; Delery & Doty, 1996; Osterman, 1994) . In this study, the core workers were customer service and sales representatives.
Because the data were from a large nationally representative sample of service centers, it was not feasible to survey multiple respondents in each establishment. Gerhart, Wright, McMahan, and Snell (2000) noted that establishment-level surveys are more reliable than corporate-level surveys because the numbers are smaller, the managers are very familiar with the HR practices they are responsible for implementing, and the HR practices are more homogenous. The average size of the core workforce in our study was 93.
To improve reliability, I surveyed only general managers, who have been found to be less optimistic about HR practices than HR managers (Wright et al., 1998) . To develop and pretest the survey used in the study, I did extensive site visits to 15 service and sales centers in four distinct markets (local, long distance, cellular, and cable) and three customer segments (residential, small business, and large business) in six telecommunications companies in five geographic regions. Each visit included interviews with the site's general manager, middle managers, supervisors, and service workers.
I also used outside information as a random check to verify survey responses. First, I compared survey items (the date an establishment was founded, its primary market, and its size) to data contained in the Dun & Bradstreet listing. The m'eans for each variable in the two data sets were not statistically significantly different. Second, I examined union contracts and found that the wage rates and job titles reported by managers at specific companies were comparable to those in the corresponding union contracts.
A survey team administered the survey by telephone. The survey averaged 52 minutes and yielded a 54 percent response rate. To check for response bias, I estimated a logit model with the dependent variable set equal to 1 if the establishment participated in the survey. Internet service providers were somewhat less likely to respond, and single establishments were somewhat more likely to respond, and these differences were controlled for in the data analysis.
Measures
As discussed above, I conceptualized highinvolvement practices along three dimensions based on prior research: skill level, work design, and involvement-enhancing HR incentives. In my field research, I did not find discrete systems in telecommunications service and sales centers that resembled the kind of "best practice" model of lean production found in the auto industry (e.g., MacDuffie, 1995). Following Appelbaum et al. (2000) , MacDuffie (1995) , and Youndt et al. (1996) , among others, I used theoretically driven additive indexes. The use of additive indexes rests on the assumption that high-involvement practices are additive in relation to performance and that different practices can be substituted for one another to obtain similar effects (Delery, 1998 ). An additive index provides a conservative estimate that may understate the synergies or multiplicative effects of combining practices. It implies that firms can achieve incremental results by investing in some high-involvement practices but that they will achieve more positive results using a full range of high-involvement practices (e.g., Appelbaum et al., 2000; Ichniowski et al., 1996) .
To capture the basic skill requirements of the customer service or sales job at each call center, I created a skill index based on the mean of two variables: (1) the number of years of formal education of the typical (median) core employee and (2) the number of years of formal and on-the-job training needed for a new employee to become proficient. The variables were transformed to z-scores.
For the work design index, I used two measures for individual discretion and two for employee collaboration in teams. The individual discretion scales used a 1-5 Likert response format, where 1 is "little or no control" and 5 is "complete control." Discretion over work methods included eight questions adapted from MacDuffie (1995); these assessed degree of influence over tasks, tools, work methods, pace of work, schedules, vacations, and technology design (a = .79). I developed four additional questions for this study to capture discretion over customer interactions. Two of the four were highly correlated and were used in this analysis: control over handling nonroutine requests and control over the pace of serving customers (a = .60). Team participation included the percentage of employees that participated in regular off-line problem-solving groups and the percentage that participated in self-directed teams. To create the index, I transformed the variables to z-scores and calculated the mean value of the four variables.
The human resource incentives measured were of four types: ongoing training, employment security, pay level, and electronic performance monitoring. Ongoing training indicated a firm's commitment to developing employees and was measured by the number of weeks of training a typical core employee received each year. Pay was the natural logarithm of the median annual base pay of the core workforce. Employment security was the percentage of the core workforce that was permanent and full-time, as opposed to part-time or contingent. Employers use part-time and contingent workers to cut costs (Houseman, 2001) and, under these circumstances, full-time workers worry that their jobs will be turned into part-time or contingent ones, with lower pay and benefits. The availability of temporary workers as substitutes for core employee also puts downward pressure on the wages of incumbent employees (Katz & Krueger, 1999) , providing incentives for them to quit. Electronic monitoring was measured as the percentage of the work performance of the typical employee that was electronically monitored (reverse-coded). I transformed all variables to z-scores and took their mean value for the HR incentive index.
In addition, I created a mean index of the ten HR practices in order to test the models of mediation and moderation. The high-involvement work systems (HIWS) index was transformed into a z-score and then interacted with the z-score for each customer segment variable. The use of standardized z-scores in interaction terms allows for them to be directly interpreted in relation to the mean of the interacted variable; it also reduces multicollinearity (Gohen & Gohen, 1983: 325) .
Establishments were dummy-coded as serving all customers in their market (these are called universal centers) or as serving a particular segment (large business, small business, or residential). If they served two segments, I asked their respondents to answer all questions as they pertained to the segment with the largest volume of customers. In all analyses, universal center was the omitted category.
The mass market is comprised of two customer segments: residential consumers and small businesses. Residential consumers demand standardization with some potential for customization via services such as call forwarding, voice messaging, or Internet provision. Small businesses demand somewhat more complex products than residential customers and are a slightly higher value-added tier in the mass-market center. Also, because this segment includes a large proportion of "mom and pop" businesses and home offices, it resembles the residential market more than the large business market. Large business customers are high-valueadded customers that usually require the bundling of complex products such as private branch exchange systems (PBX) and local area networks (LANs) to handle voice, data, and video transactions. This study does not capture larger national or global accounts because they are often based in small offices inside larger establishments, and so they are not identifiable through Dun & Bradstreet. I also separated out operator service centers (for instance, directory assistance) because they provide a mass-market service likely to generate little or no revenue (thus, they were included in the analysis of quit rates but not in the analysis of sales growth). In this sample, 22 percent of call centers served all customers; 19 percent targeted large businesses; 24 percent targeted small businesses; 30 percent targeted residences; and 5 percent were in operator services.
Dependent variables. Dependent variables were the average annual quit rate and the percent change in sales in the prior two-year period. The measure of quits excluded discharges, retirements, transfers, and promotions. The measiu-e of sales growth was the natural logarithm of the percent change in the value of sales to the particular customer base served by the center.
Control variables. I included several controls that have been found to influence HR practices. For example, investment in human capital is likely to be greater among firms that have more resources or are seeking legitimacy (e.g., Osterman, 1994) . Gontrols for organizational characteristics included whether an organization was a branch of a parent company, whether it was owned by a former Bell system affiliate, and the percentage of the workforce constituted by women. A series of dummy variables controlled for industry segment: cellular, Internet service, cable TV, or wire-line (the omitted category). Union presence was a dummy variable because the core workforce was narrowly defined so that all core workers in an establishment were either all union or all nonunion. Table 1 provides the means, standard deviations, and "pairwise" correlations of the variables. For analyses of quit rates (Hypothesis 1), I estimated a Tobit model because the dependent variable (quit rates) is "left-censored" at zero, and ordinary least squares (OLS) regression with censored data produces biased estimates. The Tobit model uses all of the information, including information about the censoring, and provides consistent estimates of the parameters (Long, 1997: 187-189) . For the sales equations, I used OLS regression because there was no censoring of the data.
RESULTS
High-Involvement HR Practices and Quit Rates
For analyses of quit rates (Hypothesis 1), I estimated three equations. Table 2 reports these results. The first equation, model 1, includes the base case of industry segment and organizational control variables alone. The second equation estimates the three HR practices dimensions (skill, work design, and incentives) together; and the third, the full additive HR practices index. The results provide partial support for Hypothesis 1. In model 2, the work design index is significant; the incentive index is marginally significant (p < .10); and the skill index is insignificant.
To estimate the effect sizes of coefficients in Tobit models, the coefficients must be decomposed into changes in the probability of observing an outcome above the left (censored) limit and changes in outcomes above the left limit, the latter of which provides an interpretation equivalent to OLS estimates (McDonald & Moffit, 1980) . In this case, the effect sizes of the Tobit coefficients are equal to 0.51 of the OLS coefficients. A one-standard-deviation change in the work design index is associated with a quit rate that is 2.27 (0.51 X 4.45) percentage points lower, and a one-standard-deviation change in the high-involvement work systems index is associated with a quit rate 3.22 percentage points lower (p < .001).
The relationship between the customer segment targeted, HR practices, and quit rates is noteworthy. Residential and operator services centers have significantly higher quit rates than universal centers (a Tobit-adjusted estimate of 3.36 percentage points higher in residential and 7.6 percentage points higher in operator services). Also, the coefficients on residential and operator services become smaller and insignificant when the HR indexes are added, suggesting that it is the variation in HR practices across segments, not the segment itself, that influences quit rates. However, for the large businesses, the coefficient on the segment becomes more significant in the presence of the HR index. That is, once HR practices are controlled for, the quit rate in establishments serving large business customers is 3.3 percentage points (Tobit-adjusted) higher than that in universal centers. Table 3 reports the results for the analysis of Hypothesis 2. The three indexes together in model 2 explain an additional 2.9 percent of the variance over the base case. The HR incentive index has the most highly significant, positive relationship with sales growth (0.18, p < .01), and the work design index is also significant (0.11, p < .05). The skill index is insignificant. Finally, with industry segments and organizational factors controlled for, a one-standard-deviation change in the high-involvement index is associated with a 16.3 percentage point increase in sales (Table 3 , model 3).
High-Involvement Practices and Sales Growth
Other Analyses
Test of mediation. Following the procedure outlined in Baron and Kenny (1986:1176) , I found that the results provide support for a partially mediated model (Hypothesis 3). The high-involvement work index is a significant predictor of quit rates (Table  2 , model 3) and sales growth (Table 3 , model 3), and quit rates are a significant predictor of sales growth (Table 3 , model 4). In the presence of quit rates, however, the size and significance of the high-involvement work index is significantly reduced (from j3 = 0.17 to j3 = 0.13, p < .01), though its effects remain significant (Table 3, model 5) . Thus, quit rates partially mediate the relationship between high-involvement HR practices and sales growth. Further analyses (not shown) revealed that the partial mediation was particularly accounted for by the work design index rather than the skill index or the HR incentive index.
Test of moderation. To test whether customer segment moderates these relationships (Hypothesis 4), I examined a series of interaction terms. The results (Table 3 , model 6) show that the segment targeted moderates the relationship between highinvolvement practices and sales growth. The use of high-involvement practices is associated with significantly higher sales growth in residential centers (0.29, p < .001) and small businesses (0.15, p < 05), but not in large business centers (compared to universal centers).
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
The findings in this study can be summarized as follows: First, greater use of high-involvement practices is associated with lower quit rates and higher sales growth in customer service and sales centers. Second, quit rates partially mediate the relationship between high-involvement practices and sales growth. The findings are consistent with the idea that high-involvement practices have a direct effect on employee performance as well as an indirect effect on performance via lower quit rates. Third, the relationship between high-involvement practices and sales growth is moderated by the identity of an establishment's primary customer base. High-involvement practices are associated with higher sales growth in small business and residential centers. In large business centers, highinvolvement practices appear to be the price of entry and to affect sales growth primarily indirectly, through quit rates. These results are consistent with a resource-based view of the firm: highinvolvement practices are rare in more costconscious markets, but they confer value because employees are better able to meet the demand for customization and service bundling.
It could be that the moderated relationship between HR practices and sales growth is a function of variation in sales opportunities for distinct customer segments. However, managers reported much greater opportunities for growth in sales revenues in large business markets than in residential or small business markets because of the former's demand for high-value-added information systems for handling internal communications, data transfer, and video. The data in the current survey are consistent with that view: the large business centers had the highest average sales growth (38 per-cent); small business centers were next, with 37 percent, followed by residential, with 28 percent.
This explanation, however, may account for the outcomes found for universal centers. They invest considerably in high-involvement practices (at a level second to the large business centers) and benefit through low quit rates (11 percent), but they have the lowest average sales growth (22 percent). A review of the establishments. that follow this approach showed that they were disproportionately more likely to be small, to define their markets as local, and to be located in small towns and rural areas. These factors suggest that their investment in high-involvement practices does not pay off because the restricted scope of their markets limits sales opportunities.
There are several limitations to this study. As in all cross-sectional studies, the issue of causality is problematic. To explore alternative explanations, I examined other variables that might account for the results, including the local 1998 unemployment rate for each establishment indicated in the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics Local Area Unemployment Series (ftp.bls.gov/pub/time.series/la.) and the local cost of living, given in the 1999 Geographic Reference Report from the Economic Research Institute. I considered factors such as size, age, ownership changes, size of customer base, market share, market scope, and age of parent company. These measures, however, are highly correlated with those already in the study and did not produce any significant differences in the results.
This study contributes to the literature on strategic human resource management by examining the role of high-involvement work systems in creating firm-specific human capital. It identifies one type of employee behavior-quitting-that mediates the relationship between HR practices and performance. The work design dimension accounts for most of the mediation results, suggesting that it may be useful for future researchers to examine how different dimensions of the HR system affect different types of employee behaviors.
The study also focuses on an increasingly strategic but neglected context -technology-mediated customer contact centers. These call centers have become a primary point of contact for customer service and sales delivery in many industries. The current study is based on a nationally representative sample of establishments in the telecommunications industry, so that the findings are generalizable to call centers in that industry. However, given that call center management has become an industry in itself, serving many other service and manufacturing organizations, the findings of this study have implications for those contexts as well. Because mass customization arguably characterizes markets in banking, insurance, airlines, computer software, and goods-producing industries, investing in the human resource capabilities of customercontact employees in call centers serving these industries is also likely to have an economic payoff. Future empirical work is needed to assess this question in a wide array of industry contexts.
